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AVERTING MALPRACTICE BY INFORMATION:
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PEDIATRIC
TREATMENT ENVIRONMENT
Andrew Popper*
Some years ago, a fourteen-year old minor child, who had stepped
barefoot on a piece of jagged wood, sat on the examination table in
the office of a pediatrician. The parent of the minor stood at the head
of the table, the pediatrician at the base, examining the Wound. A
needle-sized sliver of wood had entered the bottom of the left foot of
the patient and had split into several pieces, causing pain and present-
ing the risk of infection. This approximates the dialogue that ensued:1
Doctor: "What did you step on, a porcupine? (Laughs) Listen, the
good news is that I think I can get them out fairly easily."
Patient: "Will it hurt?"
Doctor: "It won't be bad. You're a big guy. You'll barely notice it."
Parent: "What about infection?"
Doctor: "Once I get these out, we can put him on an antibiotic, but
I doubt that will be needed."
Patient: "It hurts when you touch it. I think it's pretty deep."
Doctor: "You want to go to the hospital?" (Laughs)
Patient: "No."
Parent: "How long will this take?"
Doctor: "Just a few minutes." At that point a physician's assistant is
called, entering the examination room a few moments later, handing
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. I would like to thank
the many students who have worked on the informed consent project including Anya Guyer,
Julia Wright, Beth Uhlman, Mark Wright, and Julie Gierach.
1. The difficulty inherent in informing children about proposed medical treatment and there-
after securing consent or refusal has been addressed in isolated situations involving mature mi-
nors, abortion, sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and federally funded experimentation
or testing. The problems associated with doctor to minor communication have not been effec-
tively addressed, however, in the most common interaction, basic pediatric care, and that is the
problem area that prompted this Article. This research began in fall, 1995 after the events de-
picted in the narrative above, with a survey sent to 173 pediatricians in Montgomery County,
Maryland, to determine their attitudes on informed consent and children. The full survey and all
responses are on file in my office. Some of the survey results, discussed herein, convinced me
that not only is a change needed, but that it would be welcomed by those doctors who spend
their careers treating children.
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the doctor a tray with a variety of tools apparently designed for such
an event.
Doctor (to parent): "This will be easier on him if you step outside."
Parent (to patient): "Is that O.K.?"
Patient: "I guess."
Doctor: "Let's get going." In the following ten minutes, the patient
experienced pain, cried (for the first time in many years), and asked
the doctor to stop (request denied).
The cries were audible in the waiting room, and the parent re-
entered the treatment room and, after an unsuccessful attempt to calm
the patient, asked the doctor: "Can't you give him an anesthetic?"
Doctor: "We're almost done."
Patient: "Fuck! This hurts." (Parental mental note: first time that
son has used the "F" word in parent's presence)
Parent (to doctor): "Really, isn't there something you can do?"
Doctor: "There! All done."
There are endless questions one might pose based on the above in-
teraction between doctor, minor patient, and parent. Did the dis-
course reveal in advance the nature of the medical situation that
necessitated treatment? Was the proposed treatment described in a
manner understandable to the patient? Were options and alternatives
discussed regarding the proposed treatment? Was information pro-
vided regarding the risks of treatment? The consequences of non-
treatment? Was there an agreement, i.e. informed consent, on the
part of the parent or the patient to undergo the proposed treatment?
In the unrecorded body language of the interaction between the par-
ties, could one infer assent or dissent? Did this interaction occur as
described? Is it possible that behavior of this type continues to take
place in the United States in the final moments of the twentieth
century?2
DIscussION
While there is a dispute regarding the quality and nature of infor-
mation that must be disclosed as a condition for securing "informed
consent" prior to medical treatment, 3 no one seriously contends that
2. This narrative is set forth to stimulate debate and is not intended to open any old wounds.
Further, be assured that this was the first, and only, interaction between the patient and the
pediatrician. Naturally, there is no transcript to guarantee the accuracy of each word. Unin-
formed consent could have been inferred based on the interaction between the parent and the
doctor. Finally, there was no litigation after the interaction occurred.
3. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 606 (Cal. 1993) (finding it to be "unwise to require as a
matter of law that a particular species of information be disclosed," although the facts begged for
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medical care should be provided without first explaining the nature of
the treatment and the accompanying risks, at least for adult patients.4
Those who are eighteen years and older are entitled to such informa-
tion so that a judgment can be made whether to grant permission to a
health care provider to go forward with treatment. 5 In the absence of
such information, outside of well-documented exceptions,6 medical
treatment may constitute not only medical malpractice, but also an
intentional tort.7 Thus, it does not take a great leap in logic to con-
clude that the right to be informed about the nature of medical treat-
a ruling regarding content of informed consent); see Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala.
1985) (finding that all material risks should be disclosed to the patient); Leyson v. Steuermann,
705 P.2d 37, 47 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that there is a duty to disclose "potential risks and
hazards of the proposed treatment"); see also Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant
Imperative: Protecting Living Donors from the Pressure to Donate, 20 J. CORP. L. 139, 150 (1994)
("The legal doctrine of informed consent also has not been sensitive to issues involving the nu-
merical and descriptive content of information nor to whether the ... information ... assists in
making decisions.") (footnote omitted). Compare Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (permitting liability only where nondisclosure would have affected the decision of a
reasonable patient), with Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (rejecting the objec-
tive standard and applying a subjective standard in determining causation).
4. Scott, 606 P.2d at 559 (holding there is a "basic right to know and decide"); see also Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred ... than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person .. "). Treatment in the
absence of informed consent violates the most basic human right of "self-determination." Eliza-
beth Shaver, Note, Do Not Resuscitate: The Failure to Protect the Incompetent Patient's Right of
Self-Determination, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 218, 220 (1989). The information should include "the
diagnosis . . . the contemplated procedure . . . the risks . . . the prospects of success ... the
prognosis if the procedure is not performed; and . . . alternative methods of treatment." 2
DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22.01, at 22-4 (1990).
5. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 190 (5th ed. 1984)
("The informed consent doctrine is based on principles of individual autonomy,... every person
has the right to determine what shall be done to his own body.") (citation omitted). Appropriate
information prior to treatment, followed by an opportunity to decide on the course of care is
among the "most fundamental and basic rights of free people." Lisa Anne Hawkins, Note, Liv-
ing-Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1586 (1992) (quoting JAMES M. MOR-
RISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 13 (1986)). For adults, informed consent is a basic human right.
William J. Morton, The Doctrine of Informed Consent, 6 MED. & L.J. 117, 117 (1987).
6. See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987) (listing the
conventional exceptions). In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal.
1997), the California Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state statute that required paren-
tal consent prior to an abortion. Id. at 819. The decision was based in part on the premise that
for adoptions, abortion, and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, parental consent is not
required. Id. at 803. In light of the privacy interests involved in these exceptions, it has been
argued that the right to be the sole actor in the informed consent dialogue extends to narcotic
addiction, and prenatal care or treatment during delivery. Tess Pape, Legal and Ethical Consid-
erations of Informed Consent, 65 AORN J. 1122, 1124 (1997).
7. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), Justice Cardozo
proclaimed that surgery without proper consent constitutes the trespassory tort of assault. Id. at
93. Later, in Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972), the trespassory tort was classified as a
battery, when treatment is provided with no consent whatsoever (as opposed to insufficient or
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ment is fundamental. It is therefore worth inquiring why a right so
basic in the United States legal system fades away to nothingness for
most people ages seventeen and under. 8
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("Con-
vention")9 mandates that "due weight" should be given "to the views
of the child according to age and maturity." 10 A seminal case in Great
Britain reflects the Convention position, mandating that children six-
teen and under should be included in the decision making process,
subject to the treating physician determining the patient to be compe-
tent.11 In practice, however, "few children are asked if they agree...
to having a blood test, or to being given a drug, or to having an opera-
tion."'12 However, the first hurdle, recognizing the right to be in-
formed, has at least surfaced.13 Further, scholarship and research on
informed consent and children in Great Britain reflect a presumption
that minors will be involved in the informed consent dialogue.' 4 Simi-
larly, there is discourse focused on the difficulty of assessing compe-
inaccurate information in an informed consent dialogue). Id. at 8; see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 5, § 9, at 39-41.
8. "The requirement that medical care be provided to a minor only with the consent of the
minor's parent or guardian remains the general rule ... throughout the United States." Lun-
gren, 940 P.2d at 801.
9. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989)
[hereinafter CRC]. The Convention was signed by President Clinton in 1995, six years after its
adoption by the United Nations. U.S. Finally Agrees to Sign UN Accord for Children, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 12, 1995, § 1, at 22. However, as of summer, 1997, the United States is one of only
three countries that has failed to ratify the Convention. See Sir Peter Ustinov, Winds of Change
Chill Relations at the United Nations, EUROPEAN, June 12, 1997, at 22, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Eupean File.
10. CRC, supra note 9, at 166.
11. Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth., 3 All E.R. 402, 408-09 (H.L. 1985)
(Lord Fraser); see also Sheila A.M. McLean, Genetic Screening of Children: The U.K. Position,
12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 113, 123-24 (1995) (discussing the Gillick case). However,
parents have the right to override a child's determination. Re R, 14 All E.R. 177, 185-86 (C.A.
1991) (Lord Donaldson); see also J.A. Devereux et al., Can Children Withhold Consent to Treat-
ment?, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 1459, 1461 (1993) (advising physicians to act cautiously and seek legal
advice when the consent of a minor is in doubt); Ross Kessel, In the U.K. Children Just Can't Say
No, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20 (noting that in Britain it has been held that a
court can override the refusal of a minor to receive treatment).
12. George Rylance, Making Decisions with Children: A Child's Rights to Share in Health
Decisions Can No Longer Be Ignored, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 794, 794 (1996). For informed consent
for children to be fully embraced, Great Britain will have to undertake "[a] reorientation of
many of the country's health professionals." Id.
13. Id. It can be argued that the Gillick mandate is not only hollow but, at best, represents the
adoption of a "mature minor" rule. See infra note 23.
14. For example, the Institute of Public Policy Research recently published a report recom-
mending that children receive "clear and detailed information," giving them an opportunity to
"express views" and insuring that a child has the right to either "grant or withhold consent" prior
to treatment, provided that the patient is "considered to be competent by a doctor acting in good
faith and subject to the supervisory role of the courts." Id. at 794 (citing P. Alderson & J. Mont-
[Vol. 47:819
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tency levels, in the event children become engaged actively in the
consent process. 15
While questions regarding the pragmatics of communication be-
tween doctor and minor patient are being asked abroad, the dialogue
in the United States is of a different character. Scholars have engaged
in a valuable and prolific debate exploring the theoretical origins and
limits of a minor's right to be informed, with a focus on the evolution
of autonomy and differentiated capacity. 16 It may be that the debate
has a theoretical quality because the basic right to be informed does
not exist in concrete form as yet,17 and thus the focus of the academic
gomery, Health Care Choices: Making Decisions with Children, LONDON: INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y
RES. (1996)).
15. Rachel Bulford, Children Have Rights Too, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 1421, 1422 (1997).
Maturity is a gradual thing which varies from child to child and young person to young
person. A 13 or 14 year old who is in full possession of his or her faculties should not
be prevented from knowing about his or her condition. Seven year olds have different
needs and levels of understanding. This does not mean, however, that a 7 year old
should be rejected as being too young to make a decision .... [C]hildren and young
people have the right to a say in anything which affects them and for their views to be
taken seriously.
Id. "Often parents do not want their children told if they have the HIV virus. Yet how can a
child or young person deal with their condition if they do not know about it? ... When someone
else decides that they may be mature enough... ?" Id.; see, e.g., George Rylance et al., Measles
and Rubella Immunization: Information and Consent in Children, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 923 (1995)
(presenting a survey of 851 questionnaires that had been sent to various children to determine,
from the perspective of children, the capacity to make meaningful judgments regarding medical
treatment).
16. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the
Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585, 1593 (1995) [hereinafter Federle, An Empowerment
Perspective]; Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 1011-15 (1993) [herein-
after Federle, Reconceiving Rights]; Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children
to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 449, 455 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1994); Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed
Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 708-09 (1993); Symposium,
Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make Decisions, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1996); Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity Of
Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1314-20 (1988); Walter
Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and
Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 314-31; Erin A. Nealy, Comment, Medical Decision-Making for
Children: A Struggle for Autonomy, 49 SMU L. REV. 133, 159 (1995).
17. As one author noted: "As of 1986 there appears not to have been a single reported case
where a physician has been held liable for treating a minor without informed consent." Redding,
supra note 16, at 744. Twelve years later, this assessment still holds true. In the absence of a
recognition of the right to be informed, this situation is likely to continue. Further, a careful and
intelligent assessment of rights theory is not of immediate utility given the age-based technical
legal disability of children. "[C]urrent rights theories ... are incoherent because they cannot
account for the powerlessness of children." Federle, An Empowerment Perspective, supra note
16, at 1586.
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community has been to establish undeniably the entitlement to infor-
mation and decision making participation prior to treatment.' 8 Ac-
cordingly, the methodological discussion targeting matters such as
how to inform minors of differing competence levels of proposed
treatment is premature.19
The short of it is that in the United States the question of how to
inform children of the nature, risks, and alternatives prior to medical
treatment is not yet on center stage for public dialogue. It should be.
In an environment where the potential for medical malpractice liabil-
ity has become a focal point for those bent on tort limitation through
tort reform,20 it is troubling that this same group of tort-sensitive pro-
fessionals has failed to take into account not only the basic rights dia-
logue involving children but also the potential liability scenario.
While the case law is not yet rich with informed consent cases in-
volving children, it may well be just a matter of time. The exceptions
to maintaining the veil of darkness are growing. 21 Permitting minors
18. Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to Health Care, 10 TouRo L.
REV. 637, 676 (1994); Rhonda Cohn, Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 31 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 286, 287, 291 (1985); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Ap-
proach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3-5 (1986). A lack of informed consent
violates a patient's right to "bodily integrity" and "autonomy." James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E.
Coleson, A Critique of Family Members as Proxy Decisionmakers Without Legal Limits, 12 Is-
SUES L. & MED. 133, 135 (1996).
19. There has been a more extensive discussion regarding informed consent pertaining to test-
ing and related treatment funded through federal grants or federally financed programs. See 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (1997); see generally CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS,
AND LAW 133-72 (Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz eds., 1994) (discussing methods of
legally obtaining a minor's consent for research); George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplic-
ity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 297, 314-16 (1996) (arguing for one standard of informed consent for both research and
therapy); Joel E. Bernstein, Ethical Considerations in Human Experimentation, 15 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 579 (1975) (arguing that all participants in medical studies must give "volun-
tary 'educated' informed consent," but "children ... require special protection").
20. For a discussion of the effects of medical malpractice liability on tort reform, see generally
NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS
ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995);
PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation
on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 499, 504 (1989); Kenneth M. Coughlin, Reforming Health Care: State and Local Actions,
Bus. & HEALTH, Jan. 1993, at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bhlth File; Martin J. Hatlie,
Professional Liability: The Case for Federal Reform, 263 JAMA 584 (1990); David Randolph
Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38
OKLA. L. REV 195 (1985); Christopher S. Kozak, Note, A Review of Federal Medical Malpractice
Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599 (1995).
21. Redding, supra note 16, at 744 (noting that as of 1986, there was no body of case law
regarding the right of minors to information and participation in decision making prior to mental
health treatment, but "[siuch cases might begin to occur" where "informed consent procedures
are inadequate"); accord BARRY FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 65-77 (1980)
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to secure abortions without parental participation in the decision mak-
ing process,2 2 expanding the narrow "mature minor" exception, 23 and
in situations involving the most powerful of individual decisions, a "do
not resuscitate" order, requiring the minors' informed consent,24 all
suggest a shift toward increased informational and participatory
rights. These are exceptions to the general rule that minors are not
entitled to participatory rights in informed consent. This is so despite
the deeply held belief that informed consent is "at the heart" of the
doctor/patient relationship, 25 a reality that does not spring suddenly
into existence when a person turns eighteen years of age. However,
from these exceptions, one can infer that within the United States
legal system, precedent exists for the following set of perceptions: chil-
dren can understand information pertaining to complex treatment,
26
children can make decisions regarding their very lives,27 and physi-
cians can make judgments about the capacity of children to receive
and assimilate information.28 Taken in conjunction with the essential
premise that informed consent is "at the heart" of the doctor/patient
(sorting out the complexities of the informed consent doctrine, suggesting an ideal model for the
doctrine, and comparing that doctrine to the emerging constitutional right to refuse treatment).
22. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a
minor can undergo an abortion (assuming the minor is properly informed) without parental
consent); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
305(2) (1978)) (requiring a physician to notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of a minor
upon whom an abortion is to be performed).
23. For an in-depth discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see Garry S. Sigman & Carolyn
O'Connor, Exploration for Physicians of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 119 PEDIATRICS 520 (1991).
In most states, this doctrine allows a physician, who determines that a minor-patient is compe-
tent to make medical decisions, to inform the patient of the risks, benefits and alternatives to
treatment and to receive the minor's consent or refusal. Id. at 521-22; see, e.g., Younts v. St.
Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970) (holding that surgery to restore a
17-year old girl's finger did not require her parent's consent); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d
739 (Tenn. 1987) (adopting the mature minor exception and noting that minors over 14 may be
presumed to have the capacity to consent).
24. Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837-38 (W. Va. 1992). But see
Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse
Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
1165 (1996).
25. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 837.
26. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
27. "Age should not impose an artificial barrier to a minor's right to self determination."
Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right to Make Deci-
sions Regarding Life Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5 (1996).
28. A study of treatment disputes gives yet another indication of the existence (without imple-
mentation) of pretreatment information and consultation rights. "Competent minors in litigated
medical treatment disputes have significant personal rights and interests at stake, including the
right[ ] of informed consent .. " Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of
Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2110
(1996).
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relationship for minors as well as adults, these factors could convert
into a duty of care to inform which, when breached, would result in
tort liability. It would be most unfortunate if the lack of coherent
standards regarding informed consent for children produced a spate of
lawsuits resulting in substantial awards against physicians and their
insurance carriers when this is a problem that can be solved.
Putting aside the matter of personal liability and the fact that the
international community has declared that there is a fundamental
right to be informed,29 there is the premise that the rate and quality of
healing and recovery is higher with informed patients than with those
who do not understand the nature of their treatments. To test this
premise, a survey was sent to pediatrics practitioners to determine
their views and attitudes regarding informed consent and children.30
As to the effect of information on healing, the survey set forth this
statement for consideration: "Children experience greater success
with medical procedures when they participate in the discussion per-
taining to their treatment implication[s]. ' '31 The averaged agreement
level for this statement was 8.48 out of ten, the highest in the entire
survey.32
The idea that information has therapeutic value for children is not
particularly novel.33 Allowing children greater participation in medi-
cal decisions not only leads to greater compliance with the treatment,
but enhances commitment to the chosen decision. 34 Further, when a
child has the freedom to choose a course of treatment, the decision
becomes internalized, giving rise to enhanced self-motivation and
more effective recovery. 35 Personal choice encourages self-evaluative
and self-reinforcing mechanisms, such as goal-setting, which are inte-
gral to a successful treatment plan. 36 Allowing children to participate
29. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 1. The survey presented a series of statements and gave the doctors an
opportunity to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The response
options ranged from ten (10) for complete agreement to one (1) for complete disagreement.
There were 161 surveys distributed and 73 responses received. The survey was sent to physicians
listed in the 1994-1995 Bell Atlantic Montgomery County, Maryland, Yellow Pages under the
specialty "Pediatrics."
31. See supra notes 1, 30.
32. This figure is the simple average of the agreement levels to the statement. Out of the 73
respondents, 62 responded with agreement levels of 7 or more. Additional results of the survey
are discussed infra notes 87, 89-90 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between
Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 46-53 (1991) (advocating the therapeutic value of
having patients informed and involved).
34. Id. at 47; Redding, supra note 16, at 708-09.
35. Winick, supra note 33, at 49.
36. Id. at 48-49.
[Vol. 47:819
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in decision making is also a check on those situations where the best
interests of the child are not necessarily paramount 37 in selecting be-
tween treatment options. 38 Granting children a voice in treatment de-
cisions allows them to protect their own interests. 3
9
The correlation between a patient's expectations and the ultimate
success of the treatment (the so-called "mind-body" connection) 40
cannot function in the absence of pretreatment information to the pa-
tient.4' Since studies have demonstrated that granting adults a sense
of personal control through the power to make treatment decisions
has a beneficial effect on health, 42 it stands to reason that this same
37. The presumption that a parental decision is invariably more rational or valid than that of
the minor patient is not shared by some who study in the field.
[F]amily decisions often are influenced by emotional reactions . . . . this emotional
closeness can actually be a dangerous component in the family decision-making pro-
cess .... [Plarents are often too distraught to understand the medical problems and
options for care.... [During] a general period of crisis ... problem-solving capabilities
are grossly impaired .... [F]amily decisions often suffer from an inability to separate
interests .... [and] there is no basis for believing that family members have the ability
to accurately predict the treatment preferences of relatives.
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 18, at 143-44, 146, 150 (citations omitted). All too often, adults
have limited understanding (and even more limited recollection) of the contents of the informa-
tion that is the basis of giving informed consent in their own treatment. Alan Meisel & Loren H.
Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed Consent, 246 JAMA 2473, 2474-75
(1981).
38. "Finally, parents do not always make the best decisions for their children.... In addition,
the parents themselves may disagree over a proposed course of medical treatment for their
child." Hawkins, supra note 28, at 2112-13 (citations omitted).
39. See Gary B. Melton, Children's Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Science, in CHIL-
DREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 14-16 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (discussing several
studies which have proven that children as young as nine reasoned as mature as adults and had
the cognitive capacity to make rational decisions at a significantly earlier age than courts cur-
rently assume); Redding, supra note 16, at 701-09 (giving a synopsis of literature and cases in the
mental health profession where parents and professionals do not act according to the best inter-
ests of the child).
40. Henry Dreher, Proven Mind/Body Medicine: Scientific Approaches Provide Hope for
Those Suffering from Chronic Conditions, NAT. HEALTH, May 1993, at 86; see generally ELLIOTr
S. DACHER, PNI: THE NEW MIND/BODY HEALING PROGRAM (1993) (focusing on
psychoneuroimmunology, a nascent field that studies the interrelationship between mental or
cognitive stimulus and the corresponding response of the immune system).
41. See Zenia Cleigh, Mind over Cancerous Matter? Even as Experts Disagree, Evidence Con-
tinues to be Gathered, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 9, 1987, at Dl, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Calnews File. "A study by Stanford and UC Berkeley researchers has shown that...
cancer patients who participated in group therapy survived twice as long as those on medical
treatment alone.... The researchers, who had begun their study thinking it would refute popular
ideas that 'positive thinking'.., could combat cancer, were stunned by the results." Dr. Donald
J. DaLessio & Robert L. Goldstein, Before Visit to Doctor, Make a Checklist, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., March 13, 1990, at D2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Calnews File.
42. Sharon Stocker, Shelter Your Health from Emotional Stress: How to Keep Your Immunity
High in the Midst of Life's Lows, PREVENTION, Apr. 1994, at 72, 75 (paraphrasing Dr. Candace
Pert) ("Our mental and emotional states must directly impact the functioning of our immune
systems, and in turn, our ability to fight disease."). Stocker refers to two studies where informa-
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sense of control will have a positive effect on children's health when
they are given a voice in medical decisions.43 A recent experiment
involving hypertensive patients concluded that the degree to which
patients perceived they had participated in their treatment was posi-
tively correlated with the success of that treatment.44 Patients with a
lower perceived control over decisions regarding their health care had
higher blood pressure while patients with heightened involvement in
decision making had increased success levels.45 In light of the argu-
ments favoring providing children with information and participation
in decision making, it is no surprise that there have been isolated cases
where courts have taken the position that a particular minor has the
right to chart his or her course of treatment. 46
Two such cases, decided more than a quarter of a century ago,
demonstrate the capacity of courts to mandate the participation of mi-
nors. In In re Green,47 the mother of a minor with severe curvature of
the spine with accompanying paralytic scoliosis refused to consent to a
blood transfusion necessary to perform a spinal fusion.48 The minor,
sixteen-year old Ricky Green, was initially excluded from the decision
making process.49 Thereafter, he complained that a transfusion would
have transgressed his basic beliefs.50 The director of the state hospital
responded by filing a neglect petition seeking the appointment of him-
self as guardian so he could consent to the transfusions.5' After the
initial decision to dismiss the neglect petition was reversed,52 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that when the life of the minor is
not immediately imperiled, the personal choices of the minor should
tion and participation produced demonstrable health benefits. Id. at 118. In one, melanoma
patients who minimized the importance of the disease had the greatest risk of recurrence. Id. at
119. In a second, superior healing rates were achieved by those patients in educational programs
who were fully informed about melanoma. Id.
43. William B. Janzen & William Love, Involving Adolescents as Active Participants in Their
Own Treatment Plans, 41 PSYCHOL. REP. 931, 933-34 (1977).
44. Frank Kee, Patients' Prerogatives and Perceptions of Benefit, 312 BRrr. MED. J. 958, 960
(1996).
45. Id. at 959.
46. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955); In re Green, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973);
Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr, 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992). The discussion that follows
should not be read to mean that there has been a shift in the legal system that obligates health
care providers to engage minors in the informed consent dialogue.
47. In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972), affd 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
48. Id. at 388. The operation was described as having the potential of abating the risk of
spinal collapse which may have made it possible for the minor to become mobile and stand up.
Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. In re Green, 286 A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
52. Id.
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be central to treatment decisions.53 Rather than let the matter stand
based on First Amendment or parental autonomy grounds, the court
found that "it would be most anomalous to ignore Ricky in this situa-
tion when we consider the preference of an intelligent child of suffi-
cient maturity .... We need not extend this litany of the rights of
children any further to support the proposition that Ricky should be
heard. '54 As a result of this decision, a competency hearing was held
to determine the minor's wishes.55 Again, there was judicial review of
the hearing officer's decision 56 in which the court noted that Ricky's
responses confirmed that he understood the benefits of treatment, the
risks of surgery (Ricky stated that no one could assure him that the
operation would "come out right"), and the consequences of non-
treatment-the basic information set for informed consent.57
A similar outcome had occurred years earlier in In re Seiferth,58
where a fourteen-year old boy, born with a cleft palate, refused to
allow surgery to correct the condition because of his belief in mental
healing.59 Like Green, legal proceedings began when the state peti-
tioned to have the boy declared neglected and to have custody trans-
ferred to the state for the purpose of consenting to such medical
treatments. 60 The trial court found the minor to be mature and intelli-
gent, noted the absence of an emergency situation, and denied the
petition.61 The case was reversed on appeal 62 and then taken to the
New York Court of Appeals, which reinstated the trial court deci-
sion.63 Interestingly, the court found the recovery process would be
affected adversely without the cooperation and involvement of the mi-
nor, holding that "less would be lost by permitting the lapse of several
53. Green, 292 A.2d at 392. The court first addressed the right of a parent to make decisions
for a minor parent: "[W]e believe the wishes of this sixteen-year old boy should be ascertained;
the ultimate question, in our view, is whether a parent's religious beliefs are paramount to the
possibly adverse decision of the child." Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added). The court rationalized that since children of the same age can waive
constitutional rights, bring personal injury actions, and receive life sentences there is no logical
basis to ignore their perspectives and beliefs on a matter as basic as intimate and personal as
medical treatment or personal religious beliefs. Id.
55. In re Green, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
56. Id. There is no recorded decision from the competency hearing, other than the outcome
referenced in the Supreme Court opinion.
57. Id. (noting the results of the evidentiary hearing conducted in the Court of Common
Pleas, Family Court Division, Juvenile Branch of Philadelphia).
58. 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955).
59. Id. at 822. As in Green, the basic beliefs of the minor were shared by the parent. Id.
60. In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63, 63 (Child. Ct. 1954).
61. Id. at 65.
62. In re Seiferth, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955) (ordering the child to submit to
surgery against his will).
63. Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
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more years, when the boy may make his own decision to submit to
plastic surgery, than might be sacrificed if he were compelled to un-
dergo it now against his sincere and frightened antagonism. '64
Media reports regarding the battle for information, participation,
and autonomy evidenced in Seiferth and Green are not unusual.65
These cases underscore the necessity for the health care community to
take action to articulate the right of minors to be informed, to estab-
lish workable guidelines for that process, and to distribute that infor-
mation to any treatment provider for whom informed consent is
required of adult patients. It makes good sense to achieve this objec-
tive voluntarily, undertaking steps that will allow the community to
adjust to the process, rather than waiting for an inevitable series of
malpractice cases that will result in courts writing consent protocols.
The issue of whether children should be able to assent or dissent
from medical treatment derives from the tenuous legal status of chil-
dren's rights.66 It is only in the last few decades that we have moved
away from the view that children are the property of the parents, or
more specifically, of the father.67 With the end of the "children as
property" period has come a series of decisions that impose adult-like
responsibilities on minors in part based on the premise that minors
have the cognitive capacity to behave responsibly. For example, a mi-
nor will be civilly liable for harm resulting from negligent operation of
64. Id. The dissent worried that this was too big a decision to be given a young boy. Id. at 824
(Fuld, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed it would be preferable if the boy would "accede" to the
operation and, if he did, then his recovery would be improved. Id. But, the dissent noted, there
are no assurances that he would ever acquiesce to the surgery, and it would only be more trau-
matic when he was older. Id.
65. See Kathryn D. Perkins, Kids Asserting Rights in Health Care; Support Grows for Choice
in Treatment, S.F. EXAMINER, May 1, 1995, at B10 (reporting on a 15-year old who was forcibly
removed from her home by police officers and subjected against her will to painful chemother-
apy for ovarian cancer and a minor who ran away from home to avoid chemotherapy that he said
was killing him); see also Behind a Boy's Decision to Forgo Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994,
at A12 (describing the case of Benny Agrelo, a teenager who refused to take anti-rejection
therapy after having undergone a liver transplant because of excruciating side effects); Nancy
San Martin, Defiant Transplant Patient Dies at Home, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 21,
1994, at A8, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sunsen File (reporting Benny Agrelo's death
shortly after he stopped taking his medication); Gail B. Slap & Martha M. Jablow, Debating
Rights of Young Patients, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at C1 (discussing the problems that families
and medical professionals face when teenagers refuse treatment).
66. See Melton, supra note 39, at 1-18.
67. Hawkins, supra note 28, at 2076; see also Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-
Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 NoVA L. REV. 711, 712-13 (1992) (stating that chil-
dren's rights were not recognized until the mid-1960s when children were officially deemed "per-
sons" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 255 (1974) (noting that the idea that there
is a debate about the rights of children is itself a new phenomenon).
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an inherently dangerous instrumentality.68 Further, in some instances,
children are as liable as adults are when they participate in the kinds
of activities in which adults engage that have an escalated probability
of harm.69 In other legal contexts, children have been held to have the
capacity to understand and, if they so choose, waive Miranda rights, 70
receive a life sentence,71 and bring a personal injury suit.72 However,
the cognitive premise for these obligations and corresponding infor-
mational rights is construed as insufficient when children are patients.
Unless a child is deemed a mature minor 73 (an admittedly subjective
assessment reserved to a limited number of bright and vocal children),
is emancipated, 74 or is specifically given statutory75 or judicial permis-
sion76 to make medical care decisions, a child's parent or guardian has
the exclusive legal capacity to consent to or refuse a child's medical
treatment.77
68. Ewing v. Biddle, 216 N.E.2d 863, 866-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966) (applying an adult standard
of care to a child using a go-cart); Davis v. Waterman, 420 So. 2d 1063, 1063 (Miss. 1982) (apply-
ing an adult standard of care to a 13-year old operating a motor bike); Neumann v. Shlansky, 294
N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (Westchester County Ct. 1968) (applying an adult standard of care to a minor
playing golf); Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 394 (Wash. 1978) (applying an adult standard
of care to a 13-year old operating a snowmobile).
69. See Stevens v. Calumet Pub. Sch., 226 Mich. App. 441, 445 (Ct. App. 1997); Farm Bureau
Ins. Group v. Phillips, 323 N.W.2d 477, 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State v. DeFlorio, 512 A.2d
1133, 1137 (N.H. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. c (1965); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 5, § 32, at 181 & nn.65-67.
70. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (establishing that a "totality of the circum-
stances" standard should be used to consider whether a minor voluntarily and knowingly waived
his Miranda rights); United States v. Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that even alien juveniles have the capacity to waive the right against self-incrimination).
71. For a discussion of the capacity of minors to function in the legal system without parental
participation, see Commonwealth v. Fogan, 296 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1972); Commonwealth v. Moses,
287 A.2d 131 (Pa. 1971); Theriault v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1974).
72. See Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); Rear-
don v. Wilburn, 272 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1971).
73. See supra note 23.
74. See Redding, supra note 16, at 712 ("Emancipated minor laws allow minors to give con-
sent for certain enumerated treatments."). Generally, this "applies to children who live on their
own away from home, who are married, or who have a child or who are financially self-suffi-
cient." Id.
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1990) ("Any minor who is 14 years of age or older, or has
graduated from high school, or is married, or having been married is divorced, or is pregnant
may give effective consent to any legally authorized medical, dental, health or mental health
services for himself or herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary.").
76. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970)
(recognizing the mature minor exception); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987)
(creating the mature minor exception in Tennessee); Redding, supra note 16, at 712 (noting that
courts may find a child is near enough to majority and "mature" enough to make his or her own
medical decision when doing so would be in the best interest of the child).
77. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 801 (Cal. 1997).
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There is a middle ground between full informed consent by a minor
with unconditional veto power and complete denial of information
and decision making: informed assent. The operating assumption for
informed assent is that children capable of meaningful speech and dis-
cussion are competent to hear information and express an opinion.78
The content and complexity of that speech will vary based on age and
development. However, merely because children vary in their devel-
opmental capacities 79 does not mean they are any less entitled to un-
derstandable information needed to express an opinion on the plan of
treatment.80 To do so, a minor must know the diagnoses, the nature
and risks of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to treatment, and
the consequences of non-treatment. 81 Given the expanding number
and variety of exceptions regarding informed consent, the increase in
controversial treatment refusals supported by the courts and public
opinion,82 the acceptance in the international community of the right
(albeit hollow in most of those countries) to be informed, 83 and the
views in the medical community regarding the health value of infor-
mation,84 consideration of an expansive assent rule seems only
prudent.
A MODEST PROPOSAL AND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
ANTICIPATED CRITICISM
The survey mentioned earlier in this Article85 revealed not just a
belief in the value of information, but also a frustration. While there
was broad agreement on the proposition that well-informed minor pa-
tients enjoy superior healing or recovery rates compared to those who
78. Federle, Reconceiving Rights, supra note 16, at 1011-15; Hawkins, supra note 28, at 2118-
28; Rosato, supra note 27, at 21-22.
79. The variation in the capacity or competence levels of children has been used to block the
implementation of informational and participatory rights of minors. See Redding, supra note 16,
at 706-07 & n.58. "Consequently, some proponents of children's rights find themselves involved
in an apparently unwinnable debate about children's competencies and their capacities for mak-
ing rational choices." Federle, An Empowerment Perspective, supra note 16, at 1588 (footnote
omitted). "The law of informed consent remains ineffective at resolving patient comprehension
issues .... . Pape, supra note 6, at 1126.
80. Koocher, supra note 67, at 716.
81. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 4, $ 22.01, at 594.44; Committee on Bioethics,
American Academy of Pediatrics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediat-
ric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314-15 (1995).
82. See generally Rosato, supra note 27 (discussing several decisions by state supreme courts
and the public response to those decisions).
83. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 1, 30.
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are uninformed, 86 pediatricians understand (but do not respect uni-
formly) that information relevant to treatment decisions is owed to
the parent or guardian, not to the minor patient.8 7 The preceding sec-
tions of this Article suggest why, as a matter of basic rights, personal
liability, and effectiveness in care, information should be provided to
the minor. The survey responses affirmed this hypothesis and further
confirmed the premise that delivering information solely to a parent
or guardian can create problems.88 More than half of the pediatri-
cians responding agreed with the statement that "parental anxiety or
other factors ... cause[ ] many parents to consent ... without fully
exploring the alternatives and risks of treatment. ' '89 Further, the sur-
vey responses underscored the difficulty associated with providing in-
formation to minor patients who, by virtue of age and other factors,
have significantly diverse rates of comprehension and judgment.90
This factor may be partially responsible for the unwillingness of courts
and legislatures in this country to acknowledge the basic human right
to be informed. 91 One survey respondent was provoked to write, next
to the statement on differential capacity: "This is an insoluble
problem." 92
The difficulties associated with informing patients of proposed
treatment, risks, and alternatives do not end with the burden of deal-
ing with differential capacity. Even assuming that children were to be
primary participants at the pretreatment information stage, there is
86. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
87. The survey stated: "I believe my primary duty to inform prior to treatment of a minor
patient is owed to the parent." The agreement rate on this question was 7.70 on a 10 point scale.
There were 73 responses. Sixty of the responses marked the question in the clear agreement
range (7-10), but ten responded in the clear disagreement range (1-4), suggesting a conflict be-
tween the current set of legal obligations that mandates information to parents and guardians
and the judgment of 15% of the pediatricians who believe that their duty is owed to their
patients.
88. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 18, at 133 (noting that family turmoil, lack of informa-
tion, conflicting interests, emotional attachments, or lack of emotional attachments may ad-
versely affect family members' decision making capabilities); Hawkins, supra note 28, at 2112-13
(stating the proposition that there are many situations where parents and guardians will make
decisions adverse to the perceived best health care interest of their children due to misunder-
standing, disinterest, anxiety, and family strife).
89. The averaged response rate to the question of whether parental anxiety or other factors
resulted in parents consenting without information regarding "risks and alternatives" was 6.01.
Out of 72 responses, 38 clearly agreed, 17 clearly disagreed.
90. The survey stated: "When it comes to children 17 years and younger, there are problems
determining who is capable of understanding and reasoning, and who is not." The averaged
response rate for this statement was 6.24. Forty-five out of 72 respondents generally agreed with
this statement and only nine clearly disagreed.
91. See Federle, An Empowerment Perspective, supra note 16, at 1586 ("[R]ights theories ...
are incoherent.").
92. See supra notes 1, 30.
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great disagreement about what should happen next. Should children
have a right to veto proposed treatment over the objection of a parent
or guardian? 93 Is information meaningful if it is not followed with the
opportunity to exercise judgment and discretion? 94 Undoubtedly,
these problems are perceived as significant, but at this time, they are
hypothetical because children receive little or no information. At the
outset of this century, if engineers in the United States had been re-
quired to solve all foreseeable problems associated with unsafe driving
before automobiles were permitted to be sold, we would be the only
industrialized country still reliant on the horse and buggy.
Some of the most provocative and powerful legal writing on chil-
dren consists, in part, of advocacy seeking a declaration that minor
patients have the right to informed consent,95 and the corresponding
right to have their decisions become the primary determinant regard-
ing proposed treatment.96 Countervailing arguments regarding the
"insoluble problem" of differentiated capacity and the necessity of pa-
rental or guardian participation and control have kept this right lim-
ited to a tiny fraction of cases.97 Beyond the obvious importance of
parental or guardianship control, the potential for liability, the need
for uniformity in dealing with large number of patients, and the chal-
lenges of adult to child communication, lies a deeper resistance to the
declaration of the right-the fear that children, empowered with in-
formation and the right to be heard (dispositively), will make prob-
lematic, illogical, irrational, decisions. 98 This potent concern cannot
be addressed in a meaningful manner in the absence of data to sub-
stantiate or refute the fear of poor decision making. However, unlike
the example of the "unbuilt" automobile, data can be developed in
advance to ascertain whether this fear-which keeps millions of chil-
dren in the dark, depriving them of human rights declared fundamen-
tal-is real. Further, the "veto" dilemma (if children are informed,
93. See Redding, supra note 16, at 696 n.3 (noting that a veto already exists in certain
situations).
94. See Rosato, supra note 27, at 8 (taking the position that in life and death treatment deci-
sions, the child must have autonomy and the capacity to refuse treatment). The author asserts
that this right to exercise decisional power in life-sustaining treatment cases should be recog-
nized, "despite their legal inability to make less significant decisions for themselves." Id.
95. See generally Federle, An Empowerment Perspective, supra note 16 (suggesting an "em-
powerment rights" perspective with regards to children's rights); Federle, Reconceiving Rights,
supra note 16 (discussing various theories made to either justify or deny a child the choice to
make medical decisions); Tremper, supra note 16 (advising methods for revision of jurisprudence
in order to bring children's status in society up to the universal standards of respect for human
dignity); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 4, 5, 16, 18, 88.
97. See supra note 6; Federle, An Empowerment Perspective, supra note 16, at 1587-88.
98. See Melton, supra note 39, at 4-11.
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thereafter they have absolute say regarding proposed treatment) need
not be resolved in advance of developing the data.
Given the magnitude of the informed consent problem and the in-
herent liability risks, it seems appropriate to initiate a broad experi-
ment designed to learn what happens when children capable of speech
and communication are informed about the nature, alternatives, and
risks of proposed treatment. Since the law has not yet changed, how-
ever, the ultimate treatment decision still rests with the parent or
guardian. After the collection of this information, it will be possible
to assess whether the fear of irrational judgment justifies the denial of
a human right.
To initiate this inquiry, forms and response cards will be sent to the
pediatricians in the initial survey9 9 as well as to a broader population
of care providers who predominantly treat minors. Further, subject to
the significant constraints associated with the collection of empirical
data from research subjects who are minors, patient questionnaires
will be distributed and collected at a number of treatment sites. The
goal is to document a substantial number of doctor/minor patient in-
teractions and learn whether the information seemed to be under-
stood by the minor, and whether the preference expressed by the
minor patient was consistent with the judgment of the parent or
guardian and, severally, consistent with the "best medical judgment"
of the pediatrician.
Given the passionate beliefs in this field, it is not difficult to imagine
the criticisms that will be raised. At this stage, only three will be men-
tioned. First, the right of children to be fully informed and active de-
cision makers is compromised by a study that disempowers the
children from the outset. Second, the respondents have an interest in
limiting time-consuming interactions with minor patients and perhaps
a bias as to the outcome. Third, the methodology is inconsistent with
well-developed guidelines for research of this nature.
As to the first anticipated criticism, this survey presupposes that
children will not be the primary decision makers in the informed con-
sent dialogue during the term of the survey because, due to the cur-
rent state of the law, they do not have this right. To acknowledge that
this right does not exist at this time is, to an extent, heretical and could
be (wrongfully) interpreted as advocacy contrary to the proper de-
mands of those who have fought so long and hard for participation.100
Quite obviously, the intent of the survey is not to cement in place a set
99. See supra notes 1, 30.
100. See supra notes 16-17, 95-96 and accompanying text.
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of rules that obligates pediatricians to inform minors and then close
the minors out of the decisional process, but rather to assess whether
information can be understood by minor patients (as factored by age
and differential capacity), and then assess the responses to the infor-
mation put forward by the minors.
The second criticism-that pediatricians have a predisposition to
minimize the dialogue of informed consent, not expand it-cannot be
supported based on the results of the survey discussed in this Arti-
cle.' 0 ' That is not to say that there is an absence of bias. At this point,
however, in the absence of other available mechanisms to test the
premises underlying expansion of informational rights, the survey
method described earlier will be used.
Finally, there are numerous linguistic and empirical challenges with
a survey of this nature from the perspective of conventional norms for
data gathering. Before the survey instruments are sent out, there will
be a review of the entire proposed study and those changes deemed
necessary to conform to the conventions for such work will be
implemented.
Collection and analysis of data of the type described above will take
several years. In the interim, it is possible that minors will achieve full
informational and participatory rights through legislation or judicial
decisions-perhaps based on precedent setting and monumental mal-
practice awards. Past experience, however, indicates that these
changes will not occur without a struggle against the fear, distrust,
misinformation, and prejudices that have, thus far, kept children in the
dark. It is time to change a destructive practice that has continued,
unabated, for too long. Hopefully, the data generated by the survey
just described will be of use in achieving that goal.
101. See supra notes 1, 30.
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